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Pleas 
The first stage of the movement that led to the establishment the Post-Autistic Economics 
Network involved a group of economics students in France publishing a petition in June 
2000 under the banner “autisme-économie.”1 Their plea was supported by an appeal from 
some economics teachers in France. The second stage was launched in September 2000 
by the appearance of the first issue of the email newsletter you find in your inbox. By its 
second issue, the Post-Autistic Economics Newsletter had subscribers from 36 countries, 
and it currently has over 5000 subscribers from over 100 countries. In November of 2000 
http://www.paecon.net went in the air, ushering in further international interest. In 2001, 27 
economics Ph.D. students at Cambridge University in England who have come to be 
known as the “Cambridge 27” issued a petition entitled “Opening Up Economics.” The third 
stage is where we are now and at which this contribution carefully considers pleas for 
pluralism that have featured prominently during the previous two stages, as well as before 
the establishment of the Post-Autistic Economics Network. As Wade Hands (1997b, 194) 
observes: “The plea for pluralism in economics has been a frequent refrain throughout the 
history of modern economic thought. This refrain has usually been voiced by those who 
were outside, or critical of, the mainstream in modern economics.” 
Eight years before the first stage mentioned in the previous paragraph, in 1992, a group of 
economists issued a “Plea for a Pluralistic and Rigorous Economics” in an advertisement in 
the American Economic Review, calling for “a new spirit of pluralism in economics, 
 
involving critical conversation and tolerant communication between different approaches. 
Such pluralism should not undermine the standards of rigor; an economics that requires 
itself to face all the arguments will be a more, not a less, rigorous science.”2 The 
announcement had been organized by Geoffrey Hodgson, Uskali Mäki, and D. McCloskey, 
and signed by forty-four illustrious names amongst which were Nobel laureates Franco 
Modigliani, Paul Samuelson, Herbert Simon, and Jan Tinbergen. 
In 1993, the International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics 
(ICAPE) was founded as a “consortium of over 30 groups in economics” that “seeks to 
foster intellectual pluralism and a sense of collective purpose and strength.”3 Its 1997 
resource list contained 30 professional associations, 32 academic and policy journals, 11 
publishers, 16 departments, 16 centers, and 9 special projects, not all of which were 
formally affiliated with ICAPE. The consortium’s statement of purpose suggests: “There is a 
need for greater diversity in theory and method in economic science. A new spirit of 
pluralism will foster a more critical and constructive conversation among practitioners of 
different approaches. Such pluralism will strengthen standards of scientific inquiry in the 
crucible of competitive exchange.” ICAPE’s first conference on “The Future of Heterodox 
Economics” will be held during the Summer of 2003. 
The “autisme-économie” petition mentioned before, published in 2000, favored a pluralism 
of approaches in economics.4 The French students wrote: “We want a pluralism of 
approaches, adapted to the complexity of the objects and to the uncertainty surrounding 
most of the big questions in economics….” The petition of the economics teachers in 
France also stressed the need for pluralism, focusing mostly on theories.5 They concluded: 
“Pluralism must be part of the basic culture of the economist. People in their research 
should be free to develop the type and direction of thinking to which their convictions and 
field of interest lead them. In a rapidly evolving and evermore complex world, it is 
impossible to avoid and dangerous to discourage alternative representations.” 
The proposal for reforming economics entitled “Opening Up Economics” issued by the 
“Cambridge 27” in 2001, ends as follows: “We are not arguing against mainstream 
methods, but believe in a pluralism of methods and approaches justified by debate. 
Pluralism as a default implies that alternative economic work is not simply tolerated, but 
that the material and social conditions for its flourishing are met, to the same extent as is 
currently the case for mainstream economics. That is what we mean when we refer to an 
‘opening up’ of economics.”6 
Implicit in all these appeals is the observation that economics lacks pluralism. The pleas 
are defended by means of an assortment of arguments, such as discussions of the 
complexity of the economy, evaluations of the restrictions inherent in modeling, and 
assessments of the cognitive limitations on the part of economists. The advertisement in 
the American Economic Review also employs a reflexive strategy: “Economists today 
enforce a monopoly of method or core assumptions, often defended on no better ground 
than it constitutes the ‘mainstream’. Economists will advocate free competition, but will not 
practice it in the marketplace of ideas.”7 The remainder of this contribution highlights some 
problems with the pleas for pluralism, in an effort to open up ways for strengthening them 
further. 
Pluralism? 
Since pluralism itself is a reflexive doctrine — there can be more than one kind of pluralism 
— problems occur in using pluralism as an organizing principle. First, the nature of 
pluralism in the various pleas differs. A distinction needs to be made among theories, 
methods, methodologies, approaches, perspectives, models, explanations, and so on (see, 
e.g., Salanti and Screpanti 1997). Whereas the French students stress approaches, their 
teachers focus more on theories, and the British students emphasize methods and 
approaches. Somewhat troublingly, ICAPE’s statement of purpose appears to confuse 
methods and methodologies, for instance when it notes: “One conspicuous consequence of 
the homogenization of economics has been a loss of methodological pluralism.” Now, 
pluralism about methodologies involves adopting a pluralistic position towards one’s own 
understanding of the multifaceted enterprise of economics, borrowing from a wide variety of 
“shelves,” including history, literary criticism, philosophy, and sociology (see, e.g., Hands 
2001). This is not what ICAPE’s reference to methodological pluralism intends to address. 
Instead, it is concerned with pluralism about methods, which involves types of models, 
reasoning, and so on upon which economics relies (see, e.g., Dow 1997, 2002). 
Second, the source of pluralism varies. It could be ontological, epistemological, pragmatic, 
historical, sociological, heuristical, political, and so on (see, e.g., Salanti and Screpanti 
1997). Whereas the French students focus on complexity and uncertainty, their teachers 
emphasize a wide range of contextual matters, and the British students are not explicit 
about the source of pluralism. Let us take a closer look at the mechanisms outlined by the 
teachers: “Pluralism is not just a matter of ideology, that is of different prejudices or visions 
to which one is committed to expressing. Instead the existence of different theories is also 
explained by the nature of the assumed hypotheses, by the questions asked, by the choice 
of a temporal spectrum, by the boundaries of problems studied, and, not least, by the 
institutional and historical context.” The argument that theories vary across different 
scientific contexts (domains, times, interests, et cetera) raises the question whether for 
every phenomenon, question, and so on there would be a single, best account. If so, then 
this view seems to reduce to monism, which foreshadows the arguments of the subsequent 
sections. Before moving there, we will make one more observation concerning pluralism. 
Third, not much thought seems to have been given as to the classification of pluralism. The 
various objects of pluralism could be translatable or not and might be compatible or not. 
Reflexivity concerns should keep one from casting the classification in terms of 
complements and substitutes (see, e.g., Mäki 1999). The French students, their teachers, 
and the British students all seem to view heterodox and neoclassical economics as neither 
translatable nor compatible. This, again, introduces the possibility of a reduction to monism, 
as elaborated in the following sections. 
Monism! 
Most importantly, despite these apparent appeals to pluralism, upon closer scrutiny, the 
pleas seem to be inspired my monism about theories. This motivation is evidenced, for 
example by the observation that the first conference of the International Confederation of 
Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE) is on the future of heterodox economics, 
while orthodox economics is considered to be “vapid, exclusionist, and detached from its 
social and political milieu.” The French students write about neoclassical economics: “We 
no longer want to have this autistic science imposed on us.” And their teachers concur: 
“Neoclassicalism’s fiction of a ‘rational’ representative agent, its reliance on the notion of 
equilibrium, and its insistence that prices constitute the main (if not unique) determinant of 
market behavior are at odds with our own beliefs.” 
Using a label introduced by Ronald Giere (forthcoming), the appeals to pluralism on the 
part of heterodox economics may be seen as an instance of strategic pluralism. Though 
advocacy of pluralism by the French students, their teachers, and the British students may 
be couched in metaphysical or epistemological terms, could be primarily inspired by efforts 
to achieve professional power and dominance. John Davis (1997, 209; original emphasis), 
therefore, concludes that the motivation of heterodox economists “is not that their own 
theoretical approaches are also correct — a theoretical pluralist view — but rather than 
neoclassical economics is mistaken and misguided in its most basic assumptions, and that 
their own approaches remedy the deficiencies of neoclassicism — a theoretical monist 
view.” 
Also against the spirit of pluralism, heterodox economists appear to be offering a rather 
monist reading of the mainstream. The French students “oppose the uncontrolled use of 
mathematics,” their teachers “denounce the naïve and abusive conflation that is often made 
between scientificity and the use of mathematics,” and the British students dispute the 
“commitment to formal modes of reasoning that must be employed for research to be 
considered valid.” Which mathematical formalism do they oppose (see, e.g., Hands and 
Mirowski 1998; Mirowski and Hands 1998)? Is it that of the University of Chicago 
Economics Department (in particular Milton Friedman and George Stigler), of the Cowles 
Commission at the University of Chicago (especially Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu), 
or of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (most notably Paul Samuelson)? Or is it 
the mathematical formalism of the game theoretic approach of John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern, or of John Nash? And how about efforts to incorporate bounded 
rationality approaches, behavioral insights, chaos theory, complexity approaches, and 
experimental methods? As Sheila Dow (2002, 7) suggests: “[M]ainstream economics gives 
the appearance of a moderate form of pluralism.” By monistically equating orthodox 
economics with mathematical formalism, therefore, heterodox economists ignore the 
fragmentation of the mainstream and manoeuvre themselves in a vulnerable position. 
Concluding Comments 
If heterodox economists are serious about their advocacy of pluralism, as we hope they 
are, they need to carefully consider the nature, source, and classification of pluralism.8 And 
they need to confront the charge that pluralism inevitably leads to an “anything goes” view. 
They also need to beware of sliding into monism. For instance, an ontological perspective 
that stresses the patchiness of the world runs the risk of being reduced to monism because 
it might be consistent with the idea that for every phenomenon there is a single, best 
account. An epistemological view that involves the hedging of bets may reduce to monism 
if the long-term goal is a single comprehensive account. An epistemological view that relies 
on the cognitive limitations of economists may reduce to monism if the limitations are 
merely delaying the development of a single, complete, and correct theory. If heterodox 
economists desire pluralism, they need to honor its spirit when offering interpretations of 
the mainstream. If heterodox economists employ appeals to pluralism strategically in an 
effort to achieve monism, they leave themselves vulnerable to criticism. Finally, they need 
to ensure, as stressed by the British students, that the material and social conditions for the 
flourishing of pluralism are met. 
Notes 
1. A brief history of the Post-Autistic Economics Network is available at http://www.paecon.net/. 
2. The advertisement appeared in American Economic Review 82 (2): xxv. 
3. Information on ICAPE can be found at http://www.econ.tcu.edu/econ/icare/main.html. 
4. The text of the French students’ petition is available at http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/texts/a-e-
petition.htm. 
5. The text of the professors’ petition circulated in France can be found at 
 http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/texts/Fr-t-petition.htm. 
6. The open letter of the 27 Ph.D. students at Cambridge University may be accessed at 
http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/Camproposal.htm. 
7. One of the organizers of the plea, Uskali Mäki (1999), clarifies that some economists who are supporters of free 
market (object-)economics refused to sign, whereas some economists who are less enthusiastic about free market 
(object-)economics did sign. He conjectures that “when economists talk about the ‘free market’ of ideas, they do 
not use the expression in the sense in which it appears in their theories of the goods market” (504). This enables 
consistency, but eliminates full self-referentiality. 
8. Some of these observations draw on a very insightful list of questions about scientific pluralism that was drawn 
up by Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and Kenneth Waters in preparation for a workshop on scientific pluralism. 
The list is available at http://www.mcps.umn.edu/pluralism/outstanding_questions.html. 
References 
Davis, John B. (1997), “Comment”, in Salanti and Screpanti 1997, 207-11. 
Dow, Sheila C. (1997), “Methodological Pluralism and Pluralism of Method”, in Salanti and Screpanti 1997, 89-99. 
———. (2002), “Pluralism in Economics”, Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Association of 
    Institutional and Political Economics, 29 November 2002. 
Giere, Ronald N. (forthcoming), “Perspectival Pluralism”, in Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and C.  
    Kenneth Waters (eds.), Scientific Pluralism, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 
Hands, D. Wade (1997), “Frank Knight’s Pluralism”, in Salanti and Screpanti 1997, 194-206. 
——— (2001), Reflection Without Rules: Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory.  
    Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hands, D. Wade and Philip Mirowski (1998), “Harold Hotelling and the Neoclassical Dream” in Roger 
    Backhouse, Daniel Hausman, Uskali Mäki, and Andrea Salanti (eds.), Economics and Methodology:  
    Crossing Boundaries. London: Macmillan, 322-97 
Mäki, Uskali (1999), “Science as a Free Market: A Reflexivity Test in an Economics of Economics”,  
    Perspectives on Science 7 (4): 486-509. 
Mirowski, Philip and D. Wade Hands (1998), “A Paradox of Budgets: The Postwar Stabilization of American  
    Neoclassical Demand Theory”, in Morgan and Rutherford 1998, 260-92. 
Morgan, Mary S. and Malcolm Rutherford (eds.) (1998), From Interwar Pluralism to Postwar Neoclassicism, 
    Annual Supplement to Volume 30, History of Political Economy. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Salanti, Andrea, and Ernesto Screpanti (eds.) (1997), Pluralism in Economics: New Perspectives in  
    History and Methodology. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
______________________________ 
Esther-Mirjam Sent is the author of The Evolving Rationality of Rational Expectations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) and the editor (with Philip Mirowski) of Science Bought and Sold (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002).  She may be contacted at sent.2@nd.edu. 
______________________________ 
SUGGESTED CITATION: 
Esther-Mirjam Sent, “Pleas for Pluralism”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 18, February 4, 2003, article 1. 
http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue18.htm 
 
 
 
  
Concern with Policy-Relevance in the 
Latin American School of Economics 
Ana Maria Bianchi     (Universidade de Sao Paulo, Brazil) 
 
As I understand it, one of the main goals of the post-autistic movement is to stimulate the 
economics profession to transcend autism and communicate with the rest of the world, non-
economists included. One of the ways of attaining this goal is to look back at the history of 
economic ideas, which is full of interesting episodes that can help us to understand what 
happened in the past and what is going on today. Historical reconstruction may attract our 
attention to some currents of thoughts which developed outside the mainstream of the 
profession and were never made part of the academic textbooks, although they brought up 
significant new perspectives on the functioning of the economic systems.  
In this connection, it is worth recalling the episode that concerns the building of the Latin 
American School of Economics in midst 20th century. This school of thought originated in 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribe (ECLAC), founded 
in 1948. Its best known leader is the Argentinean economist Raul Prebisch. After holding 
important executive positions in the Central Bank of his country, Prebisch taught economics 
at the University of Buenos Aires and soon after joined the ECLAC staff, where he stayed 
